Jun 02, 2010

Europa: Neviđene Manipulacije Na Otvorenom Tržištu

Tagged in: bankrot
Posted by: roman in Finance And Economy

Europa: Neviđene Manipulacije Na Otvorenom Tržištu

Europska Središnja Banka je u očaju intervenirala na otvorenom tržištu i potpuno obrnula pakleni scenarij u samo nekoliko minuta.

Jun 02, 2010

Raz Degan Parla Di Signoraggio Bancario In TV (Italia1)

Tagged in: mistero italia1 signoraggio degan
Posted by: administrator in Society

Jun 01, 2010

Interpol Priprema Naloge Za Uhićenje Bankara i Političara?

Tagged in: korupcija politika banke interpol
Posted by: roman in World Top Stories

Iznenadni potez koji je povukao prvi čovjek Njemačke može začuditi još veoma mali broj ljudi. U intervjuu za radio, Njemački Predsjednik Horst Koehler je svima objasnio i dao do znanja kako stvari zapravo stoje, Njemačka je vojno prisutna u Afganistanu iz ekonomskih interesa. Nakon toga, podnio je ostavku.

I policajci su na kraju krajeva ipak samo ljudi zar ne? Kako bi mogli reagirati kad u masi koja se suprotstavila onim pravim uzrocima globalne financijske krize ugledaju svoje drage, tate, mame, braću i sestre, znajući da su savršeno u pravu?

Jun 01, 2010

Pismo Pulskom Gradonačelniku Borisu Miletiću: Alternativna Rješenja

Tagged in: kooperacija suradnja partnerstvo ekonomija
Posted by: administrator in Society

Poštovani Pulski Gradonačelniče Pule Boris Miletić,

moje ime je Aljoša Đurić, aktualni sam Predsjednik Udruge Crom Alternativna Razmjena, a javljam vam se s prijedlogom uspostavljanja kontakta povodom kritične situacije u koju su zbog dosadašnjeg potpunog negiranja problema duga na individualnim, korporativnim i suverenim nivoima upali ne samo Pula i Hrvatska, već svaki narod i nacija kojima je ovaj planet prirodno stanište. Svjetska dužnička kriza je prešla granice u kojoj su osnove matematike pobile kompliciranu ekonomsku teoriju koja nam je do sada prodavana. Preostalo je jako malo vremena za izbjegavanje katastrofe i gotovo nikakav izlaz. Što više idemo naprijed, izbori i politika postaju sve beznačajniji kako svugdje otkrivamo metastaze dužničkog karcinoma. Točku u kojoj je dugove postalo nemoguće platiti bilo kakvom kombinacijom ekonomskog rasta i poreznih nameta smo prekoračili još davno, a upravo smo prešli i onu u kojoj je dugove postalo nemoguće reprogramirati.

May 31, 2010

Daniel Estulin 1 Lipnja U Europskom Parlamentu O Bilderbergu

Tagged in: estulin bilderberg europski parlament
Posted by: roman in Society

Novi Svjetski Poredak - Autor Daniel Estulin će osvijetliti mrak u kojem djeluju Zidari Novog Svjetskog Poretka iz Grupe Bilderberg povijesnim govorom u Europskom Parlamentu.

Estulinove knjige su među najprodavanijima na svijetu. Daniel Estulin je jedan od najtraženijih svjetskih autora, a govor kojeg će 01 lipnja održati u Europskom Parlamentu o tajnoj organizaciji koja iza zavjesa upravlja globalnom politikom, ekonomijom, krizama, ratovima, prirodnim resursima, kulturom, obrazovanjem i još ponečim, spada u događaje bez presedana koji će ostati zabilježeni u povijesti.

May 30, 2010

James Galbraith Senate Testimony: Economics - Profession Or Fraud?

Tagged in: galbraith economics disgraced profession
Posted by: interceptor in Finance And Economy

"There is nothing about money that cannot be understood by the person of reasonable curiosity, diligence and intelligence.... The study of money, above all other fields in economics, is the one in which complexity is used to disguise the truth, not to reveal it. Most things in life — automobiles, mistresses, cancer — are important principally to those who have them. Money, in contrast, is equally important to those who have it and to those who don't. Both, accordingly, have a concern for understanding it. Both should proceed in the full confidence that they can." – John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence it came, where it went - 1975, p15. Galbraith wrote five best-selling books on economics, was President of the American Economic Association, economics professor at Harvard, and advisor to four US Presidents. James Galbraith is his son.

The following is the text of James Galbraith‘s written statement to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee delivered on May 4, 2010.

Chairman Specter, Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Subcommittee, as a former member of the congressional staff it is a pleasure to submit this statement for your record.

I write to you from a disgraced profession. Economic theory, as widely taught since the 1980s, failed miserably to understand the forces behind the financial crisis. Concepts including “rational expectations,” “market discipline,” and the “efficient markets hypothesis” led economists to argue that speculation would stabilize prices, that sellers would act to protect their reputations, that caveat emptor could be relied on, and that widespread fraud therefore could not occur. Not all economists believed this – but most did.

Thus the study of financial fraud received little attention. Practically no research institutes exist; collaboration between economists and criminologists is rare; in the leading departments there are few specialists and very few students. Economists have soft- pedaled the role of fraud in every crisis they examined, including the Savings & Loan debacle, the Russian transition, the Asian meltdown and the dot.com bubble. They continue to do so now. At a conference sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute in New York on April 17, the closest a former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Peter Fisher, got to this question was to use the word “naughtiness.” This was on the day that the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud.

There are exceptions. A famous 1993 article entitled “Looting: Bankruptcy for Profit,” by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, drew exceptionally on the experience of regulators who understood fraud. The criminologist-economist William K. Black of the University of Missouri-Kansas City is our leading systematic analyst of the relationship between financial crime and financial crisis. Black points out that accounting fraud is a sure thing when you can control the institution engaging in it: “the best way to rob a bank is to own one.” The experience of the Savings and Loan crisis was of businesses taken over for the explicit purpose of stripping them, of bleeding them dry. This was established in court: there were over one thousand felony convictions in the wake of that debacle. Other useful chronicles of modern financial fraud include James Stewart’s Den of Thieves on the Boesky-Milken era and Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools, on the Enron scandal. Yet a large gap between this history and formal analysis remains.

Formal analysis tells us that control frauds follow certain patterns. They grow rapidly, reporting high profitability, certified by top accounting firms. They pay exceedingly well. At the same time, they radically lower standards, building new businesses in markets previously considered too risky for honest business. In the financial sector, this takes the form of relaxed – no, gutted – underwriting, combined with the capacity to pass the bad penny to the greater fool. In California in the 1980s, Charles Keating realized that an S&L charter was a “license to steal.” In the 2000s, sub-prime mortgage origination was much the same thing. Given a license to steal, thieves get busy. And because their performance seems so good, they quickly come to dominate their markets; the bad players driving out the good.

The complexity of the mortgage finance sector before the crisis highlights another characteristic marker of fraud. In the system that developed, the original mortgage documents lay buried – where they remain – in the records of the loan originators, many of them since defunct or taken over. Those records, if examined, would reveal the extent of missing documentation, of abusive practices, and of fraud. So far, we have only very limited evidence on this, notably a 2007 Fitch Ratings study of a very small sample of highly-rated RMBS, which found “fraud, abuse or missing documentation in virtually every file.” An efforts a year ago by Representative Doggett to persuade Secretary Geithner to examine and report thoroughly on the extent of fraud in the underlying mortgage records received an epic run-around.

When sub-prime mortgages were bundled and securitized, the ratings agencies failed to examine the underlying loan quality. Instead they substituted statistical models, in order to generate ratings that would make the resulting RMBS acceptable to investors. When one assumes that prices will always rise, it follows that a loan secured by the asset can always be refinanced; therefore the actual condition of the borrower does not matter. That projection is, of course, only as good as the underlying assumption, but in this perversely-designed marketplace those who paid for ratings had no reason to care about the quality of assumptions. Meanwhile, mortgage originators now had a formula for extending loans to the worst borrowers they could find, secure that in this reverse Lake Wobegon no child would be deemed below average even though they all were. Credit quality collapsed because the system was designed for it to collapse.

A third element in the toxic brew was a simulacrum of “insurance,” provided by the market in credit default swaps. These are doomsday instruments in a precise sense: they generate cash-flow for the issuer until the credit event occurs. If the event is large enough, the issuer then fails, at which point the government faces blackmail: it must either step in or the system will collapse. CDS spread the consequences of a housing-price downturn through the entire financial sector, across the globe. They also provided the means to short the market in residential mortgage-backed securities, so that the largest players could turn tail and bet against the instruments they had previously been selling, just before the house of cards crashed.

Latter-day financial economics is blind to all of this. It necessarily treats stocks, bonds, options, derivatives and so forth as securities whose properties can be accepted largely at face value, and quantified in terms of return and risk. That quantification permits the calculation of price, using standard formulae. But everything in the formulae depends on the instruments being as they are represented to be. For if they are not, then what formula could possibly apply?

An older strand of institutional economics understood that a security is a contract in law. It can only be as good as the legal system that stands behind it. Some fraud is inevitable, but in a functioning system it must be rare. It must be considered – and rightly – a minor problem. If fraud – or even the perception of fraud – comes to dominate the system, then there is no foundation for a market in the securities. They become trash. And more deeply, so do the institutions responsible for creating, rating and selling them. Including, so long as it fails to respond with appropriate force, the legal system itself.

Control frauds always fail in the end. But the failure of the firm does not mean the fraud fails: the perpetrators often walk away rich. At some point, this requires subverting, suborning or defeating the law. This is where crime and politics intersect. At its heart, therefore, the financial crisis was a breakdown in the rule of law in America.

Ask yourselves: is it possible for mortgage originators, ratings agencies, underwriters, insurers and supervising agencies NOT to have known that the system of housing finance had become infested with fraud? Every statistical indicator of fraudulent practice – growth and profitability – suggests otherwise. Every examination of the record so far suggests otherwise. The very language in use: “liars’ loans,” “ninja loans,” “neutron loans,” and “toxic waste,” tells you that people knew. I have also heard the expression, “IBG,YBG;” the meaning of that bit of code was: “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.”

If doubt remains, investigation into the internal communications of the firms and agencies in question can clear it up. Emails are revealing. The government already possesses critical documentary trails — those of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. Those documents should be investigated, in full, by competent authority and also released, as appropriate, to the public. For instance, did AIG knowingly issue CDS against instruments that Goldman had designed on behalf of Mr. John Paulson to fail? If so, why? Or again: Did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appreciate the poor quality of the RMBS they were acquiring? Did they do so under pressure from Mr. Henry Paulson? If so, did Secretary Paulson know? And if he did, why did he act as he did? In a recent paper, Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson argue that the “Paulson Put” was intended to delay an inevitable crisis past the election. Does the internal record support this view?

Let us suppose that the investigation that you are about to begin confirms the existence of pervasive fraud, involving millions of mortgages, thousands of appraisers, underwriters, analysts, and the executives of the companies in which they worked, as well as public officials who assisted by turning a Nelson’s Eye. What is the appropriate response?

Some appear to believe that “confidence in the banks” can be rebuilt by a new round of good economic news, by rising stock prices, by the reassurances of high officials – and by not looking too closely at the underlying evidence of fraud, abuse, deception and deceit. As you pursue your investigations, you will undermine, and I believe you may destroy, that illusion.

But you have to act. The true alternative is a failure extending over time from the economic to the political system. Just as too few predicted the financial crisis, it may be that too few are today speaking frankly about where a failure to deal with the aftermath may lead.

In this situation, let me suggest, the country faces an existential threat. Either the legal system must do its work. Or the market system cannot be restored. There must be a thorough, transparent, effective, radical cleaning of the financial sector and also of those public officials who failed the public trust. The financiers must be made to feel, in their bones, the power of the law. And the public, which lives by the law, must see very clearly and unambiguously that this is the case. Thank you.

May 28, 2010

Italiju Će Zgnječiti Lavina Dospijeća Naplate Dugova (1/3 BDP-a)

Tagged in: bankruptcy
Posted by: roman in Finance And Economy

Agencija za kreditni rejting Fitch je danas kao posljedicu zabrinutosti zbog zaduženja srezala trostruku "A" ocjenu Španjolskoj.

Njemački magazin "Der Spiegel" je podsjetio financijska tržišta zašto je predloženi plan talijanskog ministra ekonomije i financija Giulio Tremonti-a očajnički žurno usvojen, i to tek nakon njegove prijetnje ostavkom.

Italiju će zgnječiti lavina dugova koji uskoro stižu na naplatu, lavina veća od one koja je pokosila Grčku, u iznosu od 1/3 talijanskog društvenog bruto proizvoda. Ignorirati ovo upozorenje predstavlja veliku opasnost za naše susjede.

Ne treba se imati ekonomski fakultet da bi se shvatilo što predstavljaju dugovi koji stižu na naplatu u visini od 1/3 talijanskog nacionalnog BDP-a. Svakom je jasno da se Italija odmah mora suočiti s problemom kolosalnih dimenzija. Ovaj karcinom je sve do prije nekoliko dana bio skrivan. Valja se podsjetiti da je Talijanska Središnja Banka privatna institucija i da je javni dug Italije dostigao 1,8 trilijuna eura (1800 milijardi).

Ova najnovija vladina mjera je nažalost još jednom potvrdila nova zaduženja kao uobičajeno jedinu prakticiranu strategiju za pokretanje gospodarstva.

Međutim "uzbuna" ovog puta nije metafora nego stvarna opasnost, talijanska dužnička situacija je poprimila kritične razmjere. U 2010 godini, upravo sada, Italiji dospijeva na naplatu 251.5 milijardi eura javnog duga što je više od 10 puta veća cifra od iznosa upravo usvojenog prijedloga ministra ekonomije i financija Tremonti-a za spašavanje onoga što se spasiti može. Radi se o ogromnim brojkama, a ozbiljnost situacije i vjerovatan scenario u ovim trenucima potvrđuju i credit default swaps-i na talijanski suvereni dug koji su porasli za 70% u samo dva tjedna na apsolutni povijesni rekord.

Kao da to nije dosta, 192,2 milijardi eura duga dolazi na naplatu u 2011 godini, a drugi obrok od 168,2 milijardi eura u 2012. Sveukupno 611,9 milijardi eura u tri godine. "Der Spiegel" navodi da je to otprilike jedna trećina (32%) talijanskog društvenog bruto proizvoda koji je po podacima Svjetske Banke za 2008 godinu iznosio 2,3 trilijuna dolara.

May 27, 2010

Komplementarne Valute

Tagged in: komplementarne valute
Posted by: administrator in Finance And Economy

Stigao je i taj dan dakle u Hrvatsku, Član Savjeta Hrvatske Narodne Banke Branimir Lokin je kao rješenje za nesolventnost predložio uvođenje komplementarnog novca, spomenuvši pri tome da u svijetu postoji preko 300 komplementarnih valuta, te ono najvažnije, da komplementarne valute može izdavati bilo tko, poduzeća, udruge, organizacije...

Ne znam da li konstantni izostanak spominjanja Crom Alternativne Valute ima nekakve veze s enciklopedijama i povijesnim knjigama u kojima će prije ili poslije negdje morati pisati "... bila je to prva alternativna valuta u Republici Hrvatskoj...", ili je to zbog toga što je Hrvatska iznimno likvidna ali nije solventna, no to nije ni toliko bitno, ali na kraju krajeva, zašto i ne spomenuti?

Pojam alternativna valuta je termin koji se koristi za bilo koju valutu koja se upotrebljava kao alternativa dominantnim nacionalnim ili multinacionalnim valutnim sustavima. Alternativne valute mogu izdavati pojedinci, korporacije ili organizacije, mogu ih izdavati i nacionalne vlade ili jedinice lokalne samouprave, a mogu se pojaviti i prirodno same od sebe kad ljudi počnu koristiti određenu vrstu robe kao valutu.

Kada se koriste u kombinaciji s nacionalnim ili multinacionalnim službenim valutama, onda se nazivaju komplementarne valute. Većina komplementarnih valuta su također i lokalne valute jer je njihova upotreba ograničena na određena područja. Zakonitost i porezni status alternativnih valuta varira od zemlje do zemlje, upotreba nekih sustava je u nekim zemljama legalna dok bi u drugim ista bila ilegalna.

Komplementarne valute mogu poslužiti kao alat za razvoj lokalnih društvenih zajednica.

Veća zaposlenost u područjima s niskim prosječnim prihodima se može postići kroz promicanje lokalnih gospodarskih aktivnosti njihovim izdvajanjem iz globalnog konteksta. Aktualno su ove aktivnosti ograničene i otežane zaostajanjem u prosječnoj produktivnosti u odnosu na najkonkurentnije robe i usluge što dostupnu ponudu na određenom geografskom području čini nekonkurentnom i s očiglednim tehnološkim zaostacima. U stvarnosti, usporedba s uvezenim robama iz inozemstva se odvija kroz međunarodne valute, zbog čega svima postaje jasno da je naprimjer pogodnije kupiti uvozni kukuruz iz Meksika zato što košta manje od onog kojeg su proizveli lokalni poljoprivrednici, ali velika većina stanovništva ne posjeduje dolare. Rezultat je taj da ovakva mjerila vrijednosti uništavaju očigledno manje konkurentnu lokalnu proizvodnju stvarajući nezaposlenost na tom teritoriju i u isto vrijeme ne dopuštajući zbog manjka prihoda u međunarodnim valutama, uvoz kojim bi se prehranilo gladno stanovništvo.

Valuta izdavana na lokalnom nivou bi međutim, bez obveze na konvertibilnost u strane valute omogućila odvajanje od mehanizama i logike globalizacije, naravno pod uvjetom da na tom teritoriju postoje neiskorišteni proizvodni kapaciteti, a toga pogotovo u zemljama u razvoju ima napretek, u sektorima poljoprivrede, odjeće i obuće, izgradnje stanova i izradnje namještaja, raznih vrsta obrta, obrazovnih usluga i skrbi o osobama, zdravstvu..., odnosno najvažnijim sektorima za društvene zajednice.

Sve što je potrebno za to je povezati zainteresirane proizvođače u sistem komplementarne valute i ponuditi posao nezaposlenima, ili siromašnima mogućnost da povećaju svoje prihode. Jednom zasićena domaća potražnja za određenim proizvodom, ako se stvori proizvodni višak u odnosu na potražnju na tom lokalitetu, može se izvoziti i prodavati u međunarodnim valutama i tako omogućiti uvoz dobara, roba i usluga koje ta lokalna društvena zajednica nije u stanju autonomno sama proizvoditi.

Sustavi komplementarnih valuta bi mogli donijeti pozitivna iskustva u izdvojenim regionalnim područjima ili na otocima s ciljem dokazivanja da je moguće zaobići aktualni destruktivni globalizirani ekonomski model. Kroz komplementarne valute korištenjem dvostrukog opticaja, ponovo prisvojiti ono što je globalizacijom oduzeto, naprimjer tradicionalne sektore predstavlja pravi izazov i alternativu gladi i stalnom pribjegavanju međunarodnoj pomoći koja se prečesto dokazuje potpuno neučinkovita, štoviše štetna.

May 26, 2010

Želim Izgraditi Najbolje Mjesto U Cijeloj Galaksiji

Tagged in: komplementarne valute
Posted by: kekec in Society

Mislim da je sazrijelo vrijeme da se mnogim stvarima stane na kraj, cenzura alternativne valute Crom u Hrvatskoj Wikipediji nije prošla tako nezamijećena kao što se to možda čini. Jučer je Branimir Lokin, član Savjeta Hrvatske Narodne Banke predložio kao rješenje za nesolventnost uvođenje komplementarnog novca kojim bi se zatvorili krugovi plaćanja. Naveo je da danas u razvijenim zemljama svijeta postoji više od 300 komplementarnih valuta s ulogom platnog sredstva iako nisu službene valute. Branimir Lokin je pojasnio da komplementarne valute može izdati bilo tko, udruga ili poduzeće jer se time ne ugrožava izvorni novac, a omogućuje se da se zatvore pojedini krugovi unutar sustava.

Jeste li pročitali "Viva Kroacija i njena demo(n)kracija", zadnju kolumnu Ane Benačić? Istina o našoj stvarnosti koju je perom prenijela na papir je toliko tužna da čovjeka zbilja baca u očaj. Ono što je mene bacilo u očaj čitajući ovaj članak nije toliko očajna situacija u koju smo se, priznajmo, sami doveli, već to što je jedino što nam preostaje da i dalje ostanemo sjediti skrštenih ruku očekujući sudbinu padajući u još dublje očajanje. Nije li to u stvari i prava svrha sveg ovog očaja koji nam se svakodnevno servira? Ja sam došao baš do tog zaključka i evo me zato tu, stekao sam dojam da su se ovdje skupili ljudi koji žele sami upravljati svojim životima i kroz ovu alternativnu valutu, umjesto da u očaju bespomoćno promatraju kako to za njih čine drugi vodeći ih ravno do dna.

May 26, 2010

Video: Ekološka Katastrofa - Rekvijem Za Meksički Zaljev

Tagged in: nafta deepwater horizon bp
Posted by: marti misterija in Environment

Ne postoje riječi koje bi mogle opisati opseg štete. U toku je ekološka katastrofa u Meksičkom zaljevu.
U čije smo ruke prepustili ovaj prekrasan planet? Prodali smo naše pravo na život dostojan čovjeka za zbrku toksičnih usluga od kojih zadnja u nizu, bušotina nad kojom je eksplodirala naftna platforma British Petroleuma Deepwater Horizon već pokazuje nesagledive posljedice. Kada ćemo prestati uništavati naš dom u ime napretka?

May 25, 2010

Globalnim Bankama Će Nedostajati 1,5 Trilijuna Dolara Kapitala

Tagged in: bankrot
Posted by: roman in Finance And Economy

Prema studiji švicarske agencije za kreditni rejting Independent Credit View, banke širom svijeta bi uskoro mogle zabilježiti deficit veći od 1,5 trilijuna dolara.

Kriza? Dugovi? Nedostajati? Kapital? Državne Intervencije? Hrvatska Wikipedija Cenzurira Crom Alternativnu Valutu?

May 25, 2010

Global Banks May Need $1.5 Trillion In Capital

Tagged in: bankruptcy
Posted by: roman in Finance And Economy

August 15, 2007 - Bloomberg: The reality is an entire market in default.

Global banks may have a capital deficit of more than $1.5 trillion by the end of next year and some may require state support, according to a study by Independent Credit View, a Swiss rating company.

Crom Alternative News

Europa: Neviđene Manipulacije Na Otvorenom Tržištu

Raz Degan Parla Di Signoraggio Bancario In TV (Italia1)

Interpol Priprema Naloge Za Uhićenje Bankara i Političara?

Pismo Pulskom Gradonačelniku Borisu Miletiću: Alternativna Rješenja

Daniel Estulin 1 Lipnja U Europskom Parlamentu O Bilderbergu

James Galbraith Senate Testimony: Economics - Profession Or Fraud?

Italiju Će Zgnječiti Lavina Dospijeća Naplate Dugova (1/3 BDP-a)

Komplementarne Valute

Želim Izgraditi Najbolje Mjesto U Cijeloj Galaksiji

Video: Ekološka Katastrofa - Rekvijem Za Meksički Zaljev

Globalnim Bankama Će Nedostajati 1,5 Trilijuna Dolara Kapitala

Global Banks May Need $1.5 Trillion In Capital

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